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1. Introduction
This paper aims to present the first contribution introducing and testing whether 
technological innovative progress (TIP) and the effects of increases in scale effects associated 
with TIP (TIPSB) has had an effect on Loan Loss Provisioning (LLP) risk strategies.  As Berger 
(2003) discusses, technological innovation can come about through internet banking, electronic 
payments systems and information exchanges (e.g., the increase in the number of ATMs – in 
the UK ATMS have increased year-on-year from 54,900 in 2004 to 69,600 in 2017).  
Furthermore, increases in TIP can have a positive effect on productivity and scale efficiencies 
as banks are able to reduce financing costs and risk through the increased use of derivatives 
and off-balance sheet activities such as securitization, something found recently by Badunenko 
& Kumbhakar (2017).  However, to the best of our knowledge, TIP and TIPSB have not, as 
yet, become a common determinant in the estimation of dynamic models within the LLP 
literature.  The implication of this is that to date, it has not been tested whether TIP or TIPSB 
affects the LLP risk behavior of bank management – which we find in this research.
This can be considered an important omission within the current literature concerning the 
potential relationship between TIP, TIPSB and LLP and needs to be considered.  Indeed, as 
banks have advanced their internal processes associated with IT systems, and better managed 
their loan portfolios through increased risk management modelling, this gives rise to 
endogeneity in any empirical specification1.  TIP and TIPSB is therefore an important 
determinant of the risk management of LLPs in banks and can follow an erratic process over 
the economic cycle as inputs change due to inventive and innovative progress.  In addition, 
technological advances can also come from external factors including changes in regulation 
(see Allen & Liu 2007), which are then implemented by banks internally, or through 
deregulation and increases in competition (see Liu, 2010 and Badunenko & Kumbhakar 2017).  
For example, the Basel accords which were implemented in our sample period resulted in 
updates to capital requirements and changed the internal risk management characteristics of 
banks with respect to LLPs (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004).  This seemingly 
exogenous effect can be internally compartmentalized into banks LLP risk management 
business models again leading to endogeneity between TIP and LLP (see, Adrian, 2018).  
Furthermore, TIP can be said to be embodied or disembodied and as such, technological 
change becomes an important characteristic of bank risk management behavior dynamically.  
1 An excellent review of changes in risk management processes and regulations in banks and their effect on bank 
operations can be found in a recent IMF paper, Adrian (2018).
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We posit that technological innovations in LLP risk management can be embodied in the design 
of information technology (IT), new regulations, and risk management processes, that are used 
in both back-end and front-end applications. Which we consider has had an effect on how loan 
portfolios are monitored, and subsequently the risk assessments utilized when agreeing to 
loans.  As Fukuyama and Weber (2015) argue “financial institutions should be willing to 
accept nonperforming loans up to the point where the lost income (including principle) on the 
marginal performing loan is just offset by the reduced monitoring costs or by the increased 
interest income on the loan portfolio” (page 46).  However, embodied technological change 
with respect to LLPs is difficult to establish unless the researcher has inside information on the 
system characteristics of banks’ IT risk arrangements and thereby their IT cost procurements 
for risk systems over time (as discussed by Berger, 2003).  
To circumvent non-reporting of individual bank spending on technological improvements 
we proxy TIP by the use of estimating technological change through a cost function (this first 
stage has been undertaken by Hunter & Timme, 1991, Drake & Simper, 2002 and Berger, 
2003).  Hence, we consider technologies such as information processing (i.e., improved quality 
in processing deposit and loan customer information), and financial technologies such as, more 
advance use of risk management statistical techniques (i.e., more efficient future risk evaluation 
of the loan portfolio) – thus estimating directly disembodied technological change.  This so 
called disembodied technological change therefore provides us with an initial insight to 
determine whether there are dynamic characteristics that should be considered when analyzing 
bank LLP risk management behavior (with which we concur).
Finally, our additional contribution is to estimate a comprehensive model that examines the 
major LLP hypotheses whilst incorporating bad management, TIP and TIPSB in a dynamic 
second stage specification.  However, we have to accept that these additional descriptors with 
LLP, could be endogenous, thereby leading to problems of estimation in a standard setting.  To 
overcome these problems we follow the approach of system GMM (Arellano & Bover, 1995 
and Blundell & Bond, 1998) and we conduct a thorough SGMM with additional post estimation 
diagnostics not commonly reported in previous LLP empirical literature.  Unfortunately, the 
former problem of finding correct instruments and ensuring that a dynamic LLP model is not 
over instrumentalized has been misinterpreted in the literature, leading to potentially biased 
and misleading results, which we aim to address.  It should be noted at this point the importance 
of the Hansen J-statistic and how researchers have misinterpreted the estimate and Roodman’s 
p-value equal to a 0.25 lower bound (Roodman, 2009b).  Indeed, Roodman (2009a) warns 
against the ‘liberal’ use of conventional significance levels when trying to rule out correlation 
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between instruments and the error term.  For example, Mamatzakis et al. (2013), Table 11, has 
all 6 models with a Hansen statistic below 0.163, Table 12 with all 4 models below 0.22 and 
Table 13 with all 5 models having a Hansen below 0.24; Skala’s (2015) Models (7) and (8) 
present p-values equal to 0.17 and 0.03; whereas, Olszak et al. (2016) Table 3 gives actual 
values (“*** denotes significant at the 1% level”) equal to 1343.45*** (Model 3), 1310.45*** 
(Model 4) and 284.4*** (Model 8), Table 4, Models 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 10 all have ‘significant at 
the 1% level’, in Table 5, all 13 different models have ‘significant at the 1% level’ and even in 
their ‘robustness check, Table 9 has 9 of the 12 models all rejecting at the 1% critical level 
Hansen statistics.  Our final contribution is to present a coherent LLP dynamic specification 
that can therefore explain these numerous theories in a fully specified model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review of previous 
literature specific to LLP.  Section 3 presents our hypotheses.  Section 4 provides a detailed 
justification of our methodological approach with Section 5 discussing the data. Section 6 
presents our empirical results and discusses them in the context of both previous studies, with 
conclusions developed in Section 7.
2.  Literature survey of traditional LLP behavior
In an economic downturn the nature of LLPs is an important determinant to be analyzed by 
regulators.  That is, if capital fails to cover the growth of bad loans in a recession there could 
be a potential feedback into the real economy as banks reduce lending to cover these losses by 
increasing LLPs.  This could ultimately exacerbate a downturn in the business cycle through 
reduced lending as found in European banks (Bouvatier & Lepetit, 2008).  Furthermore, Glen 
& Mondragón-Vélez (2011) argue, ‘understanding these dynamics’ is of importance for 
investors and regulators to determine what effect macroeconomic downturns could have on 
bank loan portfolios (see also Anandarajan, Hasan, & Lozano-Vivas, 2005) and hence 
inefficiencies.  Indeed, the bad management hypothesis argues that these inefficiencies could be 
created through poor credit monitoring (use of technology), insufficient control of operating costs, 
and unstable capital.  Given that identified credit losses are absorbed by the specific component of 
LLPs, managers could have an incentive to increase general LLPs thereby reducing future 
unidentified risks and their effect on Tier 2 capital.  Bad management therefore indicates a negative 
relationship between efficiency and LLPs and is tested directly in our new model.  
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Efficiency could also influence future income streams through cost skimping which implies 
banks cut costs such as loan monitoring and screening for higher short-term profit efficiency.  Thus, 
when banks boost profit efficiency, loan losses could increase in the future, despite an unchanged 
current level of documented nonperforming loans (NPLs).  Therefore, low efficiency could 
encourage managers to add more general LLPs for future safety whilst not increasing specific 
LLPs.  Cost skimping suggests a likely positive relationship between efficiency and general LLP, 
but also a lagged  relationship with NPL because “as time passes,…, the inaction to the loan 
portfolio becomes apparent” (Berger & DeYoung, 1997, page 853).  Hence, this leads us to posit a 
dynamic model as previous levels of LLP, through the discretionary component of bank 
management, has a feedback mechanism to current LLP levels.
The final associated LLP hypothesis states that low efficiency could increase future risk because 
of moral hazard.  In the presence of information asymmetry and agency problems, managers take 
on more risk which is entirely borne by shareholders and hence engage in risky non-traditional 
banking services, such subprime lending, to boost profitability (Hughes & Mester, 1998 and 
Fiordelisi et al. 2011). Moral hazard could therefore be prevalent when banks in the recent 
regulatory environment, considered themselves to be systemically important and hence ‘too big to 
fail’ (TBTF)2.  
Finally, it is also of interest to regulators as to why banks counter or pro-cyclically LLP 
manage risk, where one such hypothesis relates to how LLPs can be used to manipulate 
earnings by income smoothing and ultimately a bank’s share price.  With respect to economists, 
they generally regard income smoothing more positively due to reducing the negative impacts 
of asset volatility across the business cycle, for example, on bank capital (see Anandarajan et 
al., 2005).  Interestingly, contrariwise to economists, accountants regard income smoothing as 
financial manipulation (Laeven & Majnoni, 2003) whereby managers are able to use their own 
judgement to influence earnings (through the discretionary component of LLP; Bouvatier & 
Lepetit, 2008) and hence create problems for shareholders comparing firm profitability and 
subsequent optimal portfolio share allocations.  That is, income smoothing “introduces 
judgemental modifications to a firm’s earnings, that also when not induced by personal 
managers’ objectives, tend to reduce the comparability of results across firms, and may 
ultimately damage shareholder value” Laeven & Majnoni (2003), page 197.  This, of course, 
is based on the seminal findings of Litner (1956) in that corporations appear to smooth 
2  The Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) was the largest bank globally by total assets in 2008, yet required over £45 
billion in emergency government funding in October of that year in an attempt to remain liquid and maintain 
stability in the UK banking market.  It is widely recognised that the majority of the funds issued by the government 
were used to cover credit write-downs in the ill-fated recently acquired ABN-Amro subsidiary of the business.  
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dividends relative to earnings.  Indeed, reporting stability concerning income streams can 
signal cost efficiencies and could affect stock price stability and external rating performance, 
as well as lowering funding costs and increasing management bonuses and salaries (Bikker & 
Metzemakers, 2005).  Income smoothing can also distort efficient markets as complete 
information on the earnings of banks are not fully known or understood by all market 
participants; leading to arbitrage opportunities for those who know the income-smoothing 
practices of a particular bank (see, Fonseca and González, 2008 and Leventis et al. 2011).  We 
next present our hypotheses in relation to efficiencies and technological innovative progress. 
3. LLP hypotheses
Hypothesis 1. Technological Innovative Progress (TIP)
Our first measure estimates the percentage change in cost of inputs resulting from changes 
in bank technology.  Our so-called TIP measures are obtained from a Stochastic Frontier cost 
function (details are provided in Supplementary Appendix A)3.  Following Badunenko & 
Kumbhakar (2017) we estimate TIP holding everything else constant in the cost function equal 
to  where “technical change in a cost function is cost diminution over time” 𝑇𝐼𝑃 = (∂𝑙𝑛𝐶 ∂𝑇)
(page 796).  If <0, then bank outputs can be produced at a lower total cost as a result of 𝑇𝐼𝑃
TIP.  Given data and the parameter estimates obtained from the cost function, TIP is 
incorporated into our specification as an individual bank specific variable, .  In addition, 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃
TIP can be further decomposed into a scale biased technological innovative progress along the 
ray average cost curve .  If , then for a given product mix, 𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵 = (∂𝑙𝑛𝐶 ∂𝑙𝑛𝑦∂𝑇) 𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵 < 0
TIP causes larger banks to be more efficient over time than their smaller competitors and hence 
helps to minimize costs (see, Berger, 2003 and Allen & Liu, 2007).  That is, after the 
technological change, production at the previously optimal size ( ) is no longer cost 𝑄
minimizing, and bank size has to increase to  (where ) in order to minimize ray 𝑄 ∗ 𝑄 ∗ > 𝑄
average costs.  In terms of our model, this again is incorporated through individual bank 
specific estimates, .  Given that negative values of  ( ) imply technological 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵 𝑇𝐼𝑃 𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵
progress, in order to make the regression equation more intuitive, we decompose the two 
proxies into two separate dummy variables capturing negative and positive values separately.   
3 We use the standard Intermediation approach commonly estimated in the literature, see for example, Williams 
(2004), Allen & Liu (2016) Girardone et al. (2009), Wheelock and Wilson (2012) and Bryce et al. (2015).  It is 
not an aim of this paper to delve into a discussion of the input/output debate on bank modelling.
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More specifically, the negative dummy variable takes the value of  ( ) for banks 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵
with negative  values ( ) and zero otherwise.  Similarly, we introduce a second 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵
dummy that takes the value of  ( ) for banks with positive  values ( )  𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵
and zero otherwise4.  These dummies are reported as ,  and , 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 < 0 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 > 0 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵 < 0 𝐼
 respectively.𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵 > 0
Hypothesis 2: Bad Management
We include return on average equity ( ), where performance is used as a proxy for the 𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑒
quality of management.  This expands on the NPL models of Louzis et al. (2012) where the 
authors consider a ‘bad management II’ hypothesis using return on equity as a proxy for 
managerial abilities.  In LLP modelling ROE is an uncommon variable but it can show that if 
banks increase loans (holding inputs constant, e.g., monitoring) then they could see an increase 
in profitability (efficiency) in the short run.  However, in the long run they may experience 
worse bank performance results, ROE therefore serves as a proxy for poor lending abilities 
which in turn implies increased levels of LLPs.  As Louzis et al. (2012) states “performance is 
negatively associated with increases in future NPLs,…, by regarding past performance as a 
proxy for the quality of management” or in our case LLPs (page. 1015).  To include bad 
management in our model is an addition to the LLP literature which so far excludes this relevant 
variable (see, for example, Anandarajan, Hasan & Lozano-Vivas 2005; Fonseca and González, 
2008; and Leventis et al. 2011).  
Hypothesis 3: Income Smoothing
Bank management may adjust LLPs in order to report stability of income streams over time 
by increasing (decreasing) the level of LLP when net profits are high (low) in order to minimize 
variance in earnings.  To capture any income smoothing and mitigate for potential endogeneity, 
we include profit before taxes and provisions scaled by lagged total assets  (Skala, (𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡)
2015).  This implies that LLPs could increase during periods of economic growth while they 
decline throughout economic downturns (Bouvatier & Lepetit, 2008).  As stated above and to 
recap, this practice could affect market efficiency through increases in asymmetric information 
between principle and agent.  On the other hand, income-smoothing assumes a positive 
4 Similar dummy variable has been used by Bouvatier & Lepetit (2008) to capture non-linearity in the relation 
between LLP and earnings.    
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connotation for economists since it can be considered as a tool to reduce asset volatility on 
bank capital across the business cycle (Laeven & Majnoni, 2003).
Hypothesis 4: Capital Management
The capital management hypothesis is tested by the inclusion of total common equity over 
average assets ( ), in which banks manipulate (general) LLPs in order to maintain a equity
particular capital adequacy ratio under Basel I (Basel Committee, 1987), where general LLP 
are included in Tier 2, albeit subject to strict limits (see, Agarwal et al. 2007). That is, since 
there is a potentially high cost associated with raising new capital on the market, especially 
during economic downturns, there is an incentive for banks to manage their capital ratios using 
general LLP under Basel I (but less so under Basel II).
Hypothesis 5: Business Cycle
The business cycle hypotheses are tested in consideration of the significance of 
macroeconomic  coefficients which includes GDP growth ( ) and {𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜} 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅
unemployment rate ( ).  If we find a positive GDP growth and negative unemployment 𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃
rate coefficients, this indicates pro-cyclical managing of LLPs.  These are the standard 
variables utilized in the literature, see for example, Bikker & Metzemakers (2005), Bouvatier 
& Lepetit (2008) and Bushman & Williams (2012), Ghosh (2007) and Leventis et al. (2011). 
Additional Control Variables and Hypotheses of Interest. 
As is also common in the LLP modelling literature, we include both bank and industry 
specific control factors which could affect management behavior towards the manipulation of 
LLPs.  The bank specific controls include a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the bank 
is listed to the stock exchange ( ) and a size proxy ( ) expressed as the log of total 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸
assets (Pérez et al. 2008).  To capture variation in LLP with respect to loan expansions and 
increased credit risk while controlling for the non-discretionary component of LLP we include 
a control variable change in the rate of growth of loans ( ).  Forward looking provision 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑔𝑟
implies that banks anticipate that loan growth may results in future NPLs and therefore counter 
cyclically provision against potential loan losses.  A negative relationship between loan growth 
and LLP points towards lack of prudential provisioning strategies under rapid loan expansion, 
similar to Bikker & Metzemakers (2005), Fonseca & González (2008) and Skala (2015).  We 
also include Loans to Deposits  as a proxy for liquidity and loan coverage by banks.  (𝑙𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑝)
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In relation to the , we include the industry overall non-{𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠}
performing loans  and following Fujii et al. (2018) we add a dummy variable taking the (𝐼𝑁𝑃𝐿)
value of 1 if the country belongs to the EU15 group of countries, and zero otherwise ( ).  𝐸𝑈15
Finally, we include a dummy that takes the value of 1 for the years 2008-2011 and zero 
otherwise to capture variations in LLP due to the global financial crisis ( )5.𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠
4. Research design
As a basis for our LLP specification, we posit a relationship such that LLP becomes a 
function of previous years’ LLPs, and its value at time t is likely to be affected by its lagged 
term.  This general specification is given by equation (1).  




𝛼𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 ‒ 𝑗 + 𝛽𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1)
Where,  is the ratio of loan loss provisions to average loans (as in Anandarajan, Hasan & 𝐿𝐿𝑃
McCarthy 2007),  is the autoregressive component capturing dynamics in the 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 ‒ 𝑗
provisioning practices,  is the vector of explanatory variables capturing income smoothing, 𝑿𝑖𝑡
capital management, business cycle, bad management, TIP, and bank specific characteristics; 
 are individual bank specific effects; and  is an error term and where the subscripts  𝜂𝑖 𝜀𝑖𝑡 𝑖 = 1,..,𝑁
and  denote the cross sectional and time dimensions of the panel.  However, given 𝑡 = 1,…,𝑇
the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in the equation to be estimated, the conventional 
panel data estimators are inconsistent since the unobserved panel-level effects are correlated 
with the lags of the dependent variable.  First differencing  equation (1) eliminates the (Δ)
individual effects and estimation becomes a straightforward instrumental variables problem, 
which allows the existence of potentially endogenous right-hand side variables6.  This general 





𝛼𝑗Δ𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 ‒ 𝑗 + 𝛽Δ𝑿𝑖𝑡 + Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2)
5 In preliminary analysis we included time fixed effects but were found to be jointly insignificant and consequently 
we do not include them in the main model.  The results were found to be qualitatively the same.  The definition 
for the outset of the global financial crisis follows Curcio et al., (2017).  We also included a crisis dummy to 
capture the years 2008-2014 (and 2009-2014).  The results overall remain consistent. 
6 This is the Anderson and Hsiao (1981) estimator where instruments can be constructed in the form of lagged 
differences or lagged levels.
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Arellano & Bond (1991) propose the use of the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
procedure taking advantage of all available moment conditions, from which instrumental 
variables can be drawn from.  More specifically, the set of instrumental variables used in the 
estimation of equation (2) is derived from the following moment conditions, equation (3).
𝐸(𝜲𝑖𝑡 ‒ 𝑠Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 𝐸(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 ‒ 𝑠Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 0…𝑠 > 𝑗 (3)
The above equation suggests that lagged levels of the lagged dependent, and explanatory 
variables, are used as instruments for the differenced equation.  Arellano & Bover (1995) and 
Blundell & Bond (1998) suggest that variables in levels may be poor instruments for the 
differenced equation when they are close to a random walk.  To mitigate this potential 
shortcoming, they build a system of equations, consisting of the equation in differences and in 
levels in a stacked form, equation (4).




𝛼𝑗[ 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 ‒ 𝑗𝛥𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 ‒ 𝑗] + 𝛽[ 𝑿𝑖𝑡𝛥𝑿𝑖𝑡] + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4)
The above equation can be estimated as a system and Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell 
& Bond (1998) suggest using lagged levels as well as lagged differences as instruments; 
covering any potential weakness arising from the Arellano & Bond (1991) estimation 
technique.  Formally, these additional orthogonality conditions can be expressed as, equation 
(5).  
𝐸[(Δ𝑿𝑖𝑡 ‒ 𝑠(𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡)] = 𝐸[(Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 ‒ 𝑠(𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡)] = 0…𝑠 > 𝑗 (5)
The orthogonality restrictions described in equations (3) and (5) provide the underpinnings of 
the panel data system GMM (SGMM) estimation.  Under the assumption of independent and 
homoscedastic residuals, consistent parameter estimates can be obtained, while controlling for 
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity bias and the aforementioned dynamic 
relationships. 
The majority of empirical studies that have adopted the LLP GMM method also consider 
the dynamics of bank management in a combined hypothesis testing model; see, for example, 
Laeven & Majnoni (2003), Bouvatier & Lepetit (2008), Fonseca & González (2008), Bryce et 
al. (2015) and Olszak et al. (2016).  Indeed, our model incorporates jointly, bad management, 
TIP, income smoothing, capital management and business cycle hypotheses, proposing a new 
model.  This is now the preferred approach and circumvents potential problems on the 
exclusion of relevant variables in hypothesis testing; see (Anandarajan, Hasan, & McCarthy, 
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2007 and Ghosh 2007).  Rewriting equation (1) the specific econometric regression takes the 
following form, equation (6),
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗∑𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 ‒ 𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽5𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6,7{𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃(𝑆𝐵) < 0;𝑖𝑡} + 𝛽8,9{𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃(𝑆𝐵) > 0;𝑖𝑡} +  𝛾1,2{𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑡}
+  𝛿1,2{𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡} + 𝛿3,4{𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡} + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
(6
)
In equation (6), the subscripts  and  denote the bank and time dimension of the panel data (we 𝑖 𝑡
further omit these notations for simplicity).  In relation to the variables included in the model, 
lagged values of the dependent variable capture the autoregressive component in the emergence 
of doubtful loans, or time series persistency (see Packer & Zhu, 2012).  These lags give 
therefore a closer approximation to the potential impact of stock variables on LLP at time t and 
lessens the potential problems related to omitted variables (Laeven & Majnoni, 2003).  The 
introduction of lags of the dependent variable also takes into account a change in the speed of 
adjustment of loan loss provisions and “captures adjustment costs that constrain complete 
adjustment to an equilibrium level” (Fonseca & González, 2008, page 221).  The remaining 
explanatory variables follow the discussion on Section 3 with their associated hypotheses. 
5. The data
Bank-level data was downloaded from BankScope (Fitch-IBCA) over the period 2002 to 
2014, hence beginning at the introduction of Euro note circulation (€), with 
industry/macroeconomic variables obtained from World Bank and SNL Financial.  A similar 
sample period has also been used in Fujii et al. (2018), but the sample of banks has been 
decreased due to missing data in the dependent variable LLP.  Finally, McKee & Kagan, (2018) 
also utilize a data set ending in 2014 in a study of US community banks.  The sample is 
constructed based on the following rationale; firstly, we are interested in how banks based in 
member states behave in local markets with respect to LLPs and are therefore not individually 
influenced by cross-border management behavior from non-domestic bank holding companies 
located in another jurisdiction - which of course could be found under a consolidated sample7.  
7 For example, the European Central Bank supervised entity list shows banks which are supervised on the grounds 
of different ‘significant asset size’ starting from a bottom class of €30 to €50 billion.  For example, in terms of the 
Spanish bank Banco Santander S.A. (size class above €1,000 billion) it has individual ‘significant size presence’ 
in Spain, Portugal, Austria, Belgium Germany, Italy and Luxemburg.  Whereas, the French bank BNP Paribus 
(size class above €1,000 billion) has individual ‘significant size presence’ in France, Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Italy, Luxemburg, The Netherlands and Portugal.  Hence, the use of consolidated accounts could muddy the water 
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We therefore follow the methodology of the ‘SYMBOL’ bank stress testing risk assessments 
published by the European Commission that models risk associated with non-performing loans 
using only unconsolidated data (Benczur et al., 2017 also follows this procedure).  The final 
sample consists of 450 commercial banks with 3.145 observations, operating in 26 European 
countries.  Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our dynamic SGMM 
for the full sample.  (a detailed discussion on the frequency distributions of banks per country 
and year and a description of asset size classes can be found in Supplementary Appendix B).
  
INSERT TABLES 1 & 2 HERE
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix for the explanatory variables used in the regression.  
None of the bank specific variables exhibit very high correlations therefore mitigating any 
multicollinearity concerns.  With respect to the macroeconomic and industry variables, we 
observe that the reported correlations follow the theoretical expectations and the highest 
correlation is reported between the unemployment rate ( ) and industry non-performing 𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃
loans ( ), 0.576 (significant at the 5% level).  In terms of insignificance – only 15 pairwise 𝐼𝑁𝑃𝐿
correlations were found to show an insignificant relationship between the variables.  We next 
present our results.
6. Empirical results
6.1. Technological Innovative Progress (TIP) Results
Table 3, Panel A reports the results of TIP for each of the 5 quintiles (asset classes) in which 
frequency indicates the number of banks within each quintile that are negative and significantly 
different from zero.  With respect to the results we observe that 38.51% of banks experienced 
overall TIP.  In addition, the different subgroups indicate that quintiles 2, 3 and 4 (the small, 
medium and large banks respectively) experienced greater cost reductions due to TIP than the 
average sized banks.  For example, with respect to quintile 2 (small banks with assets between 
concerning which country management risk practice is used overall, say in the home country (Spain or France) 
against its overseas banks in constituent countries within the European Union.  An unconsolidated approach is 
therefore deemed best to determine the characteristics at the individual country level instead of a Bank Holding 
Company approach (consolidated) which could not differentiate across and between these interesting country 
specific management LLP difference practices – again based on the EU SYMBOL approach to analysing banks.
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€280 million and €669 million) had a TIP equal to 51.51% and quantile 3 (medium asset sized 
banks €670 million to €1,291 million) had the largest TIP equal to 65.82%.  
These results show that the small and medium banks appear to be statistically more 
innovative due to technological change than the largest banks (quintile 5 equal to 11.61%).  An 
explanation for these results is that small and medium sized banks innovate at a faster rate than 
the largest banks (quintile 5) as the latter can rely on a large customer based and branch network 
– exploiting market power for profitability.  Whereas, smaller banks rely on being agile in the 
face of innovation to counteract scale inefficiencies (being too small in asset size) to fund 
operations, reduce capital costs, and implement new technologies to reduce costs.  
Interestingly our finding is an update to Berger & Deyoung (2003), who in their analysis 
between the relationship of the largest MBHCs to smaller affiliates, find that “MBHCs apply 
some of the hard-information techniques to small bank affiliates for the first time, yielding 
substantial increases in control over these affiliates” (p. 1507) and as such the smallest banks 
had greater TIP.  As we only consider unconsolidated banks our results indicate a standalone 
size effect of small and medium size asset banks and not a relationship where the largest banks 
force cost efficiencies on smaller banks through their own innovations.  Our results could also 
show that the smaller banks are playing TIP catch-up with their larger competitors.
With respect to the scale biased results our findings show that overall TIPSB also increased, 
equal to 44.07%, but this effect is largest in relation to quintiles 1, 2 and 3 and as such these 
banks were able to increase their efficient size due to TIP (Table 3, Panel B) and hence again 
reduce costs.  The smaller and medium size banks were able to expand operations (outputs) 
faster than the largest banks due to the introduction of new technology (additional discussion 
on the distributions of TIP(SB) for different asset sizes can be found in Supplementary 
Appendix C).
INSERT TABLE 6
Figure 1 (Panels A and B) shows the distributions of TIP and TIPSB in the pre and post-
crisis periods (we follow Curcio & Hasan (2015) and define 2008 as the beginning of the crisis).  
The vertical lines represent the median of the distribution and values less than zero indicate 
technological progress.  In all panels the thin solid line represents no technological progress.  
With respect to TIP we observe that banks relied on innovations to reduce their costs more 
during than after the crisis period (2008-2014).  Indeed, we observe a shift in the density 
distribution towards the left in the post-crisis period.  These results compare nicely with 
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Badunenko & Kumbhakar (2017) who found positive technological progress for state banks 
equal to 2%, and foreign banks equal to 8% which then declined to 0% after re-regulations in 
India.  The difference between the results is that we consider GFC whereas Badunenko & 
Kumbhakar (2017) review changes in Indian bank regulations.  Furthermore, with respect to 
TIPSB, we note that banks experience size increases due to innovations both in the pre and the 
post-crisis periods.  However, this effect is stronger in the pre-crisis period (represented by the 
thin-dotted line on the left of the graph) as the post-crisis distribution shifts to the right after 
2008 (represented by the long-dash distribution).
INSERT FIGURE 1 
The above observations are further examined by presenting only the distributions of the 
banks that experienced a significant TIP result (Figure 2). Panel A shows this distribution with 
respect to those banks that exhibit reductions in cost due to technological progress.  The post-
crisis distribution has a longer left tail than the pre-crisis, indicating greater TIP for the years 
after the crisis.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
We find that banks increased technological innovations after the crisis by implementing new 
loan controls, whilst adjusting risk management process through innovations and regulation 
(for a discussion of changes in risk regulations during our sample period and how banks 
changed their operations see a recent IMF report, Adrian, 2018).  Whereas, Panel B shows the 
results for the TIPSB and as noted above, the scale effects due to technological innovations 
fade away in the post-crisis period as the distribution (solid line, Panel B) has shorter left tail, 
with a higher negative median.  
6.2. Results from dynamic LLP Model.
We estimate a first order dynamic panel data model, following the Arellano & Bond (1991), 
Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998) method of a two-step system GMM 
estimator (SGMM)8.  In our model we assume that all macroeconomic/industry control 
8 To ensure dynamic completeness, we estimate four (4) auxiliary regressions with different subsets of  lags.  𝐿𝐿𝑃
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variables are strictly exogenous to individual banks.  On the other hand, with respect to the 
bank specific variables, prior literature does not offer conclusive evidence as to whether or not 
LLP determinants should be treated as endogenous or exogenous (Skala, 2015).  From an 
economic perspective, endogeneity may arise due to simultaneous determination of LLP and 
any of the explanatory bank specific variables.  For example, LLP and innovations could be 
simultaneously determined and the direction of correlation could run from LLP to  (𝑇𝐼𝑃 𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵
).  That is, if we assume technological innovations are endogenous choice variables for banks 
and their levels are chosen so as to optimize the reported levels of LLP at , then the reported 𝑡
LLP levels may in turn effect the future level of innovations that banks are willing to attain9.  
The implication will be a causal effect from the dependent variable to bank innovations.  In 
this case, LLP and technological innovations are simultaneously determined and  and 𝑇𝐼𝑃
 should be treated as endogenous regressors and appropriate IVs be constructed and used 𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵
in estimation.  We reject the null hypothesis of a strict exogeneity test (Wooldridge, 2001), 
confirming that bank innovations are dynamically endogenous to LLP10. 
In determining consistency across the SGMM estimator and following prior literature 
(Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2003), two post estimation tests are conducted; the Hansen test 
of joint validity of the instruments and the second order serial correlation (Arellano – Bond), 
in order to evaluate the correct specifications of the models.  The Hansen over identification 
test confirmed the validity of our instruments and the absence of correlation between the 
instruments used and the error term in the models (we fail to reject the null hypotheses in all 
of the model specifications).  It should be noted there is no clear rule as to the optimal number 
of instruments that should be included in a GMM estimator.  However, the proposal by 
Roodman (2009a) concerning the number of instruments and the Hansen J-test p-values are 
followed.  For example, in Model 1, the number of instruments (442) does not exceed the 
number of groups (450).  Second, the p-values obtained from the Hansen J-statistic equal 0.516.  
In addition, we investigate the relevance of the SGMM instruments based on under-
identification tests, following Wintoki, Linck & Netter (2012) (these tests are discussed in more 
detail in Supplementary Appendix C).  Furthermore, we confirm the validity of the SGMM by 
We chose the preferred lag specification on the basis of Akaike's/Schwarz's Bayesian information criteria and a 
Vuong (1989) test.  Results are available upon request.
9 This process is subject to income smoothing, capital management and pro/counter cyclical provisioning purposes, 
among others – as implied by equation (6).
10 Further lag analysis where we regress the current levels and changes of these levels of the bank specific 
variables on LLP lags, suggests that previous year’s LLP levels are negatively (positively) related to levels of 
( ), confirming the findings of the strict exogeneity test.  Results of the strict exogeneity and 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 < 0 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵 < 0
lag analysis tests are available upon request.
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rejecting the null of no first order serial correlation  and we fail to reject the null 𝐴𝑅(1)
hypothesis of no second order serial correlation ; which indicates a correct model 𝐴𝑅(2)
specification.  Finally, the finite sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005) is 
implemented, calculating corrected standard errors.
6.2.1. Discussion of results
With respect to the empirical findings, we present results from different estimators that 
operate under different assumptions.  More specifically, we report findings from static 
OLS/fixed-effects regressions, dynamic OLS and SGMM11.  The estimated coefficients from 
the regressions are presented in Table 4.  The results suggest that the LLP ratio is a positive 
function of its own lag, with significant coefficients equal to 0.28 to 0.58 (columns [1] and [2]).  
One insight from the dynamic OLS is the importance of past levels of LLP in explaining 
variations in its current levels (the  increases from 0.18 in the static OLS to 0.62 in the 𝑅2
dynamic).  This finding suggests that banks are likely to increase their loan provisions if they 
have already made provisions in the previous year.
INSERT TABLE 4
Hypothesis 1: Technological Innovative Progress (TIP)
With respect to TIP, one insight that becomes clear is that in the absence of technological 
progress, there is no effect on banks’ LLP levels ( and   are insignificant 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 > 0 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵 > 0  
across all 4 models).  However, banks that experience technological progress observe two 
different results.  First,  is negative and significant in both dynamic models.  It is 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 < 0
therefore apparent that as banks extend their innovative and technological capabilities with 
respect to LLP - through their abilities to determine delinquent and problem loans via new 
innovations - costs decrease through TIP.  These reductions could occur from changes in bank’s 
use of better computer risk modelling systems and also regulation – an addition to standard 
cost efficiencies (see, Adrian, 2018).  Even though we find evidence of bad management 
(hypothesis 4), banks can potentially reduce the costs associated with their bad management 
11 Prior literature has estimated both static and dynamic LLP specifications.  For example, Leventis et al., (2012) 
and Curcio & Hasan, (2015) estimate static models; Bouvatier et al., (2014) estimate a dynamic regression and 
Laeven & Majnoni (2003) and Curcio et al., (2017) estimate both. 
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practices through the advancing TIP.  That is, improving technology mitigates the impact of 
bad management.12
When taking into account the effect that technological innovations have had on the asset 
size of banks, we observe that  is positive and significant.  This result suggests one 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵 < 0
of two things, firstly, as bank’s cost minimizing scale of outputs increases due to innovations 
in technology (for example, capturing more markets with new products or geographical 
expansion thereby increasing lending), banks show an ability to recognize additional risk (see 
Hunter & Timme, 1991, page 339).  They are then able to service the LLP book through the 
introduction of advanced implementation of computer risk management systems on the loan 
portfolio (Hunter & Timme, 1991, call this ‘production innovations’), leading to higher levels 
of LLPs.  Or, secondly, banks which experience changes in their cost minimizing output scale, 
report higher LLPs when at the same time report higher pre-provisioning profits, thus 
strategically amplifying their income smoothing practices.  This could show a link between 
income smoothing and .  For example, the smallest asset sized banks experience greater 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵
scale changes due to technological innovations.  Therefore, if the second hypothesis holds, we 
would expect to find that smaller banks would be more prone to income smoothing.  In 
untabulated results we further test this size hypothesis by re-estimating equation (6) and 
including an interaction term between  and a size dummy (taking the value of 1 for 𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
banks that belong to the first 3 quintiles and zero otherwise).  The estimated coefficient of the 
interaction term is positive but insignificant, offering no support in favor of aforementioned 
size hypothesis.  All other estimated coefficients remain qualitatively similar to the reported 
ones in Table 413.  
Hypothesis 2: Bad Management
We find a negative and significant  coefficient in all 4 models thereby showing that 𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑒
European banks exhibit bad management by skimping on monitoring and thereby reducing 
future earnings by diverting cash resources (or profits/dividends) to bolster LLPs in the future 
to cover bad decisions in the past (also corroborating Louzis et al. 2012).  That is, generally, 
European bank managers show poor abilities to monitor their loan portfolios and offer loans to 
12 We also tested the interaction term between  and  and  and  (those banks which 𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑒 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 < 0 𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑒 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵 < 0
experienced improvements in technology).  Both coefficients on these interaction terms were found to be positive 
yet insignificant, while the individual effects of ,  and  remained the same and significant 𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑒 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 < 0 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵 < 0
as the current model discussed in this section (results are not presented to save space).
13 We also used a dummy taking the value of 1 for banks that are smaller than the median of the log of total assets 
and the results still hold.  The interaction term coefficient was positive but still insignificant. 
Page 18 of 34
people who are likely to default in the event of a macroeconomic downturn.  This result ties in 
nicely with the negative and significant relationship between  and LLP explained in the 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅
business cycle hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: Income Smoothing
The income-smoothing hypothesis concerns the relationship between net income ( ) 𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
and LLP, where we find a significant positive relationship in all estimated regressions (the 
coefficient ranges from 0.478 in the SGMM to 0.231 in the dynamic OLS).  This finding is 
similar to the results across 40 countries by Fonseca and González (2008), European banks by 
Leventis et al. (2011), South East Asian countries by Packer & Zhu (2012), central European 
banks by Skala (2015) and US banks by Balasubramanyan et al. (2016).  Such that, “regardless 
of the commendable or condemnable motives underlying income smoothing” (as shown by a 
positive relationship) “this behavior contributes to financial soundness of banks and reduces 
procyclicality” (page. 150, Bikker & Metzemakers, 2005).  In addition, the drop in the 
estimated coefficient of  when moving from the static OLS to the dynamic OLS implies 𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
that current pre-provisioning profits are correlated with past LLP levels, suggesting a 
potentially endogenous relationship.  When controlling for endogeneity and fixed effects under 
a SGMM, we note that the estimated coefficient doubles in magnitude (equal to 0.4780, Table 
4, column [1]).  This result therefore suggests that ignoring endogeneity and LLP dynamics 
could understate the economic significance of income smoothing.  Therefore, if  is 𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
thought to have at least a predetermined effect on LLP then a SGMM approach should be 
estimated.
Hypothesis 4: Capital Management
With respect to the capital management hypothesis,  the sign of the estimated 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
coefficient remains unchanged across all models (negative), but its significance changes in the 
static fixed-effects model (significant at the 10%).  However, this significance could be an 
artifact of endogeneity as previous years LLPs are related to levels and hence changes in levels 
of equity.  That is, when taking into account bank specific effects and endogeneity in the 
SGMM, the results indicate that European banks do not boost their Tier 2 capital positions 
using LLPs, and as such, do not suffer from a “banking system capitalization (problem, which) 
is a barrier to business cycle vulnerability” (Glen & Mondragón-Vélez, 2011, page 158, our 
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italics).  A result also found for Indian banks by Ghosh (2007) and European banks by Leventis 
et al. (2012).  
Hypothesis 5: Business Cycle
We find that there is a negative and significant relationship with  (GDP growth) 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅
ranging from  in the GMM model, to  in the static OLS model.  Therefore, ‒ 0.0477 ‒ 0.0292
European banks did not undertake ‘forward looking’ provisioning, a result corroborated by the 
negative association between credit growth ( ) and LLP.  The implication is that when 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑟
loan portfolios expand during booms, managers decrease reserves, thus not accounting for 
possible future losses.  This result corresponds favorably with the implementation of IAS39 
across Europe.  Implying that objective evidence is required on loan impairments before loan 
loss provisions can be made, hence restricting buffering across the economic cycle and 
exacerbating pro-cyclical LLP.  
In addition, Craig (2005) observes that banks in developed countries (i.e., Australia, Hong 
Kong, Japan, New Zealand and Singapore) generally show a tendency of assessing risk over 
relatively short horizons, leading them to under-estimate risk during boom periods while over-
estimating the risk during economic downturns.  If this was also to be true for European banks 
our results explain the cancelling out of LLP across the business cycle.  However, as Skala 
(2015) notes, our finding “prompts the question of whether the reserves that central European 
banks established during economic booms are sufficient” (page. 35).  Furthermore, this result 
could of course be due in part to overriding macroeconomic conditions in our sample period.  
That is, there was no need to forward provision as banks had different risk management 
behavior characteristics.  To this end, the unemployment rate ( ) is found to be 𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃
insignificant with respect to LLP in all models, see also Bikker & Metzemakers (2005) and 
Olszak et al. (2016).  A possible explanation here, is that the unemployment rate does not act 
as a proxy for loan demand (Beatty & Liao, 2011).  The effect of unemployment is therefore 
minimal and hence we find an insignificant relationship between the unemployment rate, bank 
lending and LLPs.  This relationship between unemployment and LLP is not a forward-looking 
relationship, but a current reactionary co-movement: unemployment increases → loan defaults 
increases →LLP increases.  
Additional Control Variables and Hypotheses of Interest
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In addition, our findings highlight that  (industry non-performing loans) and  INPL 𝑙𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑝
(loans to deposits) do not have significant effects on LLPs, and therefore, industry bank 
characteristics and individual bank liquidity constraints do not override risk management 
behavior characteristics.  Interestingly, in all specifications there is a negative and significant 
link between the EU15 status and loan provisions.  That is, ceteris paribus, banks who operate 
in the EU15 countries provision less for bad loans, with respect to their non EU15 counterparts.  
The projected LLP values from the estimated SGMM regression for non EU15 and EU15 
countries are 0.0120*** and 0.0096*** respectively14.   With respect to the additional control 
variables, the dummies  (those banks which are listed on their domestic stock exchanges) 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑
and (the global financial crisis of 2008) are both insignificant.  Finally, with respect to 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 
the control variable  this has a negative effect on LLP in all models, indicating that the 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸,
largest European banks report lower LLPs suggesting that their credit portfolio diversification 
leads them to report lower provisioning levels. 
6.2.2. Additional analyses
Table 5 presents 3 additional SGMM specifications that consider whether our results are 
stable if we exclude  and , analyse post crisis income smoothing and also a non-𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵
linear income smoothing model following Balboa, López-Espinosa, & Rubia, 2013.  In terms 
of our first robustness check, in Model 1, we can see that removing  and  has no 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵
effect on all the hypotheses 1 to 5 above, everything holds albeit we do note that  and 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸
 now become significant.  Given that  could potentially offer an insight, we again 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠
re-estimate our main SGMM but now Model 2 controls for increased income smoothing during 
the financial crisis (see for example, Curcio, De Simone, & Gallo, 2017).  To investigate for 
increased income smoothing during the crisis, relative to the pre-crisis period, we include an 
interaction term .  Column [2] in Table 5 reports the estimated coefficients.  𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 × 𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
Most of the estimated coefficients remain similar to those reported in Table 4 column 1, 
however the dummy turns insignificant.  With respect to , a one-sided 𝐸𝑈15 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 × 𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
t-test does not confirm the hypothesis that banks have smoothed their income via LLPs more 
intensively during or after the crisis.  
INSERT TABLE 5
14 95% confidence intervals were estimated using the Delta method, where *** indicates significance at the 1%.
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The third set of additional analysis considers a potential non-linear effect of income 
smoothing, as incentives to smooth income may be dependent of the relative size of earnings 
(see, Balboa, López-Espinosa, & Rubia, 2013).  In this latter case we generate a dummy 
variable ( ) taking the value of  for banks reporting pre-provisioning earnings 𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
greater than the annual 75th percentile and zero otherwise15.  In Model 3 we find that the 
coefficient of  is positive and significant at the 1%, indicating that the best performing 𝑑𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
EU banks are more prone to report higher LLPs when earnings are high (Table 5, Column [2]).  
Once again we find that all hypotheses 1 to 5 are unaffected and the remaining coefficients 
maintain their sign and significance in line with Table 4, Column [1]. 
7. Conclusions
In the banking loan loss provisioning literature there has been widely different reported 
managerial behavior characteristics including; income smoothing, capital management, 
business cycle theory, and bad management hypotheses.  The latter’s effect can originate from 
three sources of inefficiency; cost, technological innovative progress (TIP) and scale based TIP 
(TIPSB).  We present a coherent and fully specified dynamic models that find both bad 
management, TIP and TIPSB are endogenous with respect to LLP risk management behavior.  
That is, previous studies which have only explicitly allocated banks’ income smoothing, capital 
management as the internal change characteristic in provisioning behavior could be mis-
specified through the exclusion of bad management, TIP and TIPSB.  
With respect to our results we find that 38.51% of banks experienced overall TIP but that 
small banks with assets between €280 million and €669 million had a TIP equal to 51.51% and 
medium asset sized banks €670 million to €1,291 million had the largest TIP equal to 65.82%.  
These results show that small and medium asset sized banks are more innovative due to 
technological progress than the largest banks (assets greater than €3,137, TIP equal to 11.61%).  
In addition, when we consider scale biased effects, again the smallest banks show the largest 
TIPSB equal to 58.51% whereas the largest banks showed the smallest TIPSB equal to 20.51%.  
15 This dummy is a variation used by Bouvatier & Lepetit (2008) as here we are interested in identifying the best 
performing banks in our sample and not simply the ones reporting positive earnings.  We also control for non-
linearity in the earning’s smoothing around the zero threshold by including a dummy variable taking the value of 
 in the case of positive earnings before provisions and taxes, and zero otherwise.  The results are 𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
qualitatively similar to the ones reported in Table 9, Column [3] so we do not present them here.  Including both 
 and  led to VIF values of 85.68 and 85.24 respectively, thus we chose not include both variables 𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
together.
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That is, ceteris paribus, the larger banks have smaller scale TIPSB efficiencies relative to 
smaller banks and therefore smaller to medium banks see larger cost efficiencies in the 
introduction of new technologies.
The main findings associated with our new LLP model show that as banks extend their 
innovative and technological capabilities with respect to LLP, costs decrease through TIP.  
These reductions could occur from changes in bank’s use of better risk modelling of their loan 
portfolios and also through new regulations such as Basel capital requirement directives.  In 
addition, even though we find bad management practice, banks can potentially reduce these 
costs through advancing TIP.  That is, the introduction of new technology and the 
improvements that it brings mitigates the impact of bad management and its associated cost 
inefficiencies.  
With respect to the traditional LLP hypotheses, we concur that banks income smooth, 
although profits are correlated with past LLP levels, suggesting a potentially endogenous 
relationship.  European banks do not boost their Tier 2 capital positions using LLPs, and as 
such, do not suffer from a banking system capitalization. Further, these banks did not undertake 
‘forward looking’ provisioning, a result corroborated by the negative association between 
credit growth and LLP.  Finally, we find that the macro environment had little to no effect as 
European banks did not undertake ‘forward looking’ provisioning corresponding favorably 
with the implementation of IAS39 across Europe limiting the pro-cyclical nature of LLPs.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
𝐿𝐿𝑃 3,145 0.0101 0.0314 -0.2610 1.2379
𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 3,145 0.0151 0.0172 -0.0531 0.7081
𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 3,145 0.0999 0.0718 -0.0029 0.8620
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑔𝑟 3,145 0.0772 0.3085 -0.9879 8.7691
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅 3,145 0.0121 0.0330 -0.1481 0.1190
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃 3,145 0.0818 0.0326 0.0340 0.2720
𝑟𝑜𝑒 3,145 0.0624 0.2592 -8.0755 1.0438
𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 < 0 3,145 -0.0081 0.0172 -0.1766 0
𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵 < 0 3,145 -0.0032 0.0050 -0.0230 0
𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 > 0 3,145 0.0211 0.0298  0 0.1722
𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵 > 0 3,145 0.0043 0.0053  0 0.0222
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 3,145 6.8930 1.3556 3.7446 10.754
𝐼𝑁𝑃𝐿 3,145 0.0480 0.0468 0.0008 0.4487
𝑙𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑝 3,145 1.2601 1.6074 0.0202 25
Summary statistics of the variable included in the estimation of equation (6).
Page 29 of 34
Table 2. Pairwise Correlation Matrix
Column1 𝐿𝐿𝑃 𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑟 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅 𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃 𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑒 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 < 0 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵 < 0 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 > 0 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵 > 0 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 𝐼𝑁𝑃𝐿 𝑙𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑝
𝐿𝐿𝑃 1       
𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 0.0595* 1
𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 -0.0334* 0.2596* 1
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑟 -0.0602* 0.1025* 0.0386* 1
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅 -0.1069* 0.1081* 0.0195 0.1546* 1
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃 0.0948* -0.0423* -0.0137 -0.0474* -0.1459* 1
𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑒 -0.2871* 0.2305* 0.00870 0.0720* 0.2036* -0.1099* 1
𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 < 0 -0.0887* 0.0206 -0.0296* 0.0162 0.0920* -0.00430 0.0418* 1
𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵 < 0 0.0657* -0.0233 -0.0829* -0.0907* -0.2349* 0.1067* -0.0671* -0.2515* 1
𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 > 0 -0.0483* -0.0469* 0.0626* 0.00280 0.0458* -0.0244 0.0365* 0.3403* -0.2638* 1
𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵 > 0 0.0173 -0.0483* -0.0613* -0.1097* -0.1479* 0.1900* -0.0645* -0.1136* 0.5356* 0.1063* 1
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 -0.0709* -0.0542* -0.3063* 0.00400 -0.0465* -0.0225 0.0750* -0.00400 0.3150* 0.1089* 0.3376* 1
𝐼𝑁𝑃𝐿 0.1153* -0.0306* -0.0391* -0.1046* -0.3237* 0.5767* -0.1854* -0.0525* 0.2394* -0.0230 0.3082* -0.0109 1
𝑙𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑝 -0.00220 0.0272 0.1843* -0.0163 -0.0502* 0.0375* -0.0447* -0.2843* 0.0246 -0.00340 0.00820 -0.0512* 0.0303* 1
Pearson's correlation coefficients
* Statistically significant at 10%
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Quintile 1 – 
Smallest
71       11.29 629
Quintile 2 – 
Small
324       51.51 629
Quintile 3 – 
Medium
414       65.82 629
Quintile 4 – 
Large
329       52.31 629
Quintile 5 – 
Largest
73       11.61 629











Quintile 1 – 
Smallest
368       58.51 629
Quintile 2 – 
Small
358       56.92 629
Quintile 3 – 
Medium
313       49.76 629
Quintile 4 – 
Large
218       34.66 629
Quintile 5 – 
Largest
129       20.51  629
Overall           1,386       44.07   3,145
Frequency: Number of observations with negative technological progress and 
negative scale biased technological progress. The table suggests that 51.51% of small 
sized banks experienced technological progress (Panel A, Quintile 2).  The asset size 
of banks belonging in the five quintiles presented here are discussed in detail in 
Supplementary Appendix B.
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Table 4. Results of Loan Loss Provisioning Identification
Dynamic Models Static Models
SGMM Pooled OLS 
with lag
Pooled OLS VIF Fixed Effects
𝐿𝐿𝑃 (𝑡 ‒ 1)  0.2801*** 0.5880***
(0.0802) (0.149)
𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡  0.4780*** 0.2310**  0.2930** 1.16  0.2880***
(0.155) (0.107) (0.133) (0.110)
𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 -0.0404 -0.0203 -0.0229 1.21 -0.136**
(0.0284) (0.0148) (0.0184) (0.0614)
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑟 -0.0016 -0.0003 -0.0029 1.06 -0.0025
(0.0049) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0019)
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅 -0.0477*** -0.0360*** -0.0292** 1.43 -0.0355***
(0.0142) (0.0135) (0.0146) (0.0129)
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃  0.0544 0.0320  0.0642 1.56 -0.0172
(0.0523) (0.0334) (0.0725) (0.0482)
𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑒 -0.0351*** -0.0356*** -0.0444*** 1.15 -0.0434***
(0.0072) (0.0059) (0.0069) (0.0074)
 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 < 0 -0.0917** -0.0599* -0.0713 1.32 -0.0106
(0.0369) (0.0340) (0.0544) (0.0393)
  𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵 < 0  0.3170** 0.2910***  0.417*** 2.31  0.298
(0.144) (0.100) (0.138) (0.250)
  𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 > 0  0.0344 0.00230  0.0087 1.38 -0.0263
(0.0352) (0.0144) (0.0158) (0.0610)
𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵 > 0   -0.0682 -0.0583 -0.0469 2.15  0.0013
(0.117) (0.0809) (0.117) (0.172)
   𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 -0.0020*** -0.0009* -0.0022*** 1.42 -0.0033
(0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0045)
  𝐼𝑁𝑃𝐿  0.0016 -0.0138  0.0073 2.03  0.0500**
(0.0198) (0.0148) (0.0271) (0.0197)
 𝑙𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑝 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0004 1.15 -0.0017
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0017)
   𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠  0.0012 -0.0002  0.0013 1.56  0.0006
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0008)
    𝐸𝑈15 -0.0024* -0.0025*** -0.0035*** 1.29 -0.0222
(0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0 .0193)
   𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑  0.0002 0.0009 0.0014 1.05  0.0433*
(0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0. 0231)
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡  0.0179*** 0.0123**  0.0242*** 0.0480
(0.0069) (0.0057) (0.0072) (0.0393)
N 3145 3145 3195 3195
R2 0.622 0.187 0.218
Robust Hausman test (p-value) 0.000
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.957
Lags 2-4
IV count (groups) 442 (450)
Hansen test of overidentification 
(p-value)
0.516
Underidentification test for 
differenced equation
0.0078
Underidentification test for levels 
equation
0.0220
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  Windmeijer (2005) robust standard errors reported.  For brevity, we report 
only the key diagnostics here.  A detailed description of the additional statistics is presented in Supplementary 
Appendix D.   and  are tests for first and second order serial correlation, under the null hypothesis of 𝐴𝑅(1) 𝐴𝑅(2)
no serial correlation.  The ‘lags’ show the number of lags used in the GMM model for bank specific variables.  
The Hansen test of overidentification is under the null that all instruments are valid.  
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𝐿𝐿𝑃 (𝑡 ‒ 1)  0.2550***  0.2890***  0.2670***
(0.0776) (0.0774) (0.0798)
𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡  0.6390***  0.5080***
(0.1650) (0.1640)




𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 -0.0513 -0.0456 -0.0371
(0.0343) (0.0297) (0.0268)
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑟 -0.0015 -0.0014  0.0015
(0.0050) (0.0052) (0.0052)
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅 -0.0529*** -0.0415** -0.0390***
(0.0162) (0.0183) (0.0132)
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃  0.0500  0.0511  0.0517
(0.0559) (0.0536) (0.054)
𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑒 -0.0395*** -0.0357*** -0.0344***
(0.0087) (0.0073) (0.0068)
𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 < 0 -0.0831** -0.0855**
(0.0332) (0.0383)
𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵 < 0  0.3170**  0.3820**
(0.1490) (0.1570)
𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 > 0  0.0328  0.0427
(0.0376) (0.0351)
𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵 > 0 -0.0639 -0.156
(0.108) (0.123)
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸  0.0005 -0.0021*** -0.0018**
(0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0007)
𝐼𝑁𝑃𝐿  0.0087  0.0089  0.0067
(0.0211) (0.0238) (0.0196)
𝑙𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑝  0.0003 -0.0001  0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠  0.0023**  0.0012  0.0005
(0.0011) (0.0024) (0.0008)
𝐸𝑈15 -0.0027** -0.0005 -0.0027**
(0.0013) (0.0028) (0.0012)
𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 -0.0008 -0.0031  0.0007
(0.0013) (0.0035) (0.0009)
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 -0.0004  0.0168***  0.0212***
(0.0120) (0.0063) (0.0072)
N 3145 3145 3145
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.919 0.945 0.828
Lags 2-6 2-4 2-4
IV count (groups) 390 (450) 442 (450) 443 (450)
Hansen (p-value) 0.290 0.470 0.511
Year Effects Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  Windmeijer (2005) robust standard errors reported.   and  are 𝐴𝑅(1) 𝐴𝑅(2)
tests for first and second order serial correlation, under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation.  The ‘lags’ 
show the number of lags used in the GMM model for bank specific variables.  Our results hold under different lag 
choices.  The Hansen test of overidentification is under the null that all instruments are valid.
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Figure 1. Distributions of Technological Change and Scale Biased Technological Change: pre and post-crisis - Vertical lines represent the median.  
Values less than zero indicate technological progress
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Figure 2. Distributions of banks exhibiting technological progress and scale biased technological progress - Vertical lines represent the median
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Online Supplementary Appendix for
“European bank loan loss provisioning and technological innovative 
progress”
The aim of this appendix is to provide supplementary information concerning the sample 
used in the study, the research design and implementation, robustness analysis and supporting 
information for Table 4.  This appendix is structured as follows: Appendix A presents the 
Stochastic Frontier cost function utilised in the estimation of Technological Innovative 
Progress. Appendix B provides details concerning the sample used in the study. Appendix C 
offers additional System Generalised Method of Moments (SGMM) diagnostics and robustness 
checks, and finally, Appendix D provides information concerning Table 4.
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Appendix A: Stochastic Frontier Analysis Cost Function Estimation
This section provides details with respect to the estimation of two Technological Innovative 
Progress proxies, TIP and TIPSB.  To obtain estimates of ITIP(SB) we use a standard cost 
frontier which assumes banks minimize costs subject to exogenously driven input prices, 
quantities of outputs/netputs, macro-economic conditions, their own managerial inefficiency, 
and a random error.  This cost minimization behavior can be modelled via a cost function that 
relates variable costs to exogenous factors, given input prices, (assuming banks choose an input 
mix to minimize costs), equation (A.1).  We define our translog as an extension of Hunter & 
Timme (1991) and Drake & Simper (2002), including a polynomial in time (T) to capture 
















































































𝜼𝑻𝒌𝒏𝑻𝒍𝒏𝒚𝒌𝒊𝒕𝒍𝒏𝒚𝒏𝒊𝒕 + 𝜽𝟏𝑬𝑼𝟏𝟓 +   +  𝒖𝒊
(A.1)
Where,  is total costs,   are input prices for staff expenses, loanable funds, and physical 𝐶𝑖𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑡
capital,  are bank outputs (loans, other income deriving assets and net off balance sheet 𝑦𝑖𝑡
income), equity  a fixed netput controlling for managerial risk appetite, funding costs and 𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡
also scale bias when comparing banks of various sizes (see also, Staikouras et al. 2008 and 
Kalyvas and Mamatzakis, 2014),  is a dummy variable to account for country effects 𝐸𝑈15
(defined as in the list of countries in Table A.1),  is the stochastic error term.  Finally, the 𝑢
usual symmetry and linear homogeneity in input prices restrictions are imposed in estimation 
of equation (A.1).
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Appendix B: The Sample
In this appendix we provide additional details concerning the sample of banks used in the 
analysis.  Table B.1 provides frequency distributions of the number of banks per country for 
the SGMM sample (after taking lags).  It can be noted that the largest number of banks in our 
sample are from Germany (18.31%), France (15.61%) and Italy (9.35%).  Table B.2 provides 
the total number of bank year observations comprised in the final SGMM sample per country 
and year.  The majority of countries show a stable number of banks across each year (for 
example, Germany having between 44 to 56 bank year observations).  Ireland is excluded from 
the sample as we found considerable varying data problems.  Finally, Table B.3 reports the 
descriptive statistics on the total assets of the five quintiles for the sample used.  Total assets 
range between €42 million to €46,820 million, with a mean of €2,504 million and a standard 
deviation of €4,376 million.
INSERT TABLES B.1, B.2 AND B.3
 
Appendix C: Additional Analysis of Empirical Results
This section provides additional analysis of the main empirical results.  This appendix is 
structured as follows: Section 1 presents an additional discussion on the distributions of 
TIP(SB), Section 2 presents diagnostics on the validity of the instruments used in the SGMM 
Model 1 (Equation 6), Section 3 presents additional System GMM regressions and robustness 
checks, and finally, Section 4 presents details supplementary information for Table 4.
C.1 Technological Innovative Progress (TIP) Results 
This section offers additional analysis of the distributions of TIP(SB) for each asset size 
cluster as identified in Table A.3, appendix A.  Figure C.1 presents the distribution of TIP for 
each asset class where we see that the results are overall symmetrical – minimum and maximum 
equal to -0.1766 and 0.1722 respectively.  However, the smallest and largest asset sized 
quintiles for banks are predominately skewed towards decreasing TIP in relation to the 
remaining quintiles.  The latter graphical relationship can also be seen in Figure C.2 where in 
terms of TIPSB, where the large and largest banks (quintiles 4 and 5 respectively) are also 
skewed to the right.  This implies any efficient size effect due to TIP is predominately 
dominated by the medium and smaller banks – ceteris paribus, the larger banks have smaller 
scale technological efficiencies relative to smaller banks.
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INSERT FIGURES C.1 AND C.2
C.2 System GMM diagnostics
To further investigate the validity of the instruments used in the SGMM Model 1, we follow 
Wintoki, Linck & Netter (2012) and split Equation (4) is its two constituent parts and we assess 
the relevance of the instruments used for each equation separately.  More specifically we 
approximate the levels and differenced equation estimated in the SGMM and we assess the 
lagged levels instruments used in the difference equation (equation [C.1]) and the lagged 
differences used as instruments in the levels equation (equation [C.2]).  We perform these tests 










𝛼𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 ‒ 𝑗 + 𝛽𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 Instruments: 𝛥𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 ‒ 1, 
𝛥𝑿𝑖𝑡 ‒ 1
(C.2)
Table C.1 reports the Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) first-stage chi-square test of under-
identification of individual endogenous regressors.  Panels A and B report the first stage under-
identification statistics form the 2SLS estimation of equations (C.1) and (C.2) respectively.  
We report results for the equation in differences (levels) for the bank specific variables entering 
the SGMM estimation in the instrumental variables matrix in a diagonal form as in Arellano 
and Bond (1991).  In all first stage regressions, we reject the null hypotheses of under-
identification for the individual bank specific variables.  We also reject the joint under-
identification hypothesis (Anderson statistic LM statistic), for both the equation in difference 
and in levels with p-values of 0.0078 and 0.0220 respectively, indicating that the both models 
are identified.  Overall, the results suggest that the instruments chosen in the SGMM are 
relevant.  It should be noted that these tests serve as an indication for the quality of the 
instruments used in the SGMM, as consistency of the SGMM estimates implies the joint 
estimation of the differenced and levels equations (that is, equations C.1 and C.2).
INSERT TABLE C.1 
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C.3 Robustness checks
In this section we present additional robustness checks to further analyse the consistency of 
the estimated SGMM model against potentially influential observations.  We estimate equation 
(6) on a sample resulting from trimming a fraction of the observations when excluding 
influential data points.  More specifically, we consider three approaches.  In the first approach 
(R1), we remove outliers identified as the largest prediction errors from equation (6).  
Specifically, we estimate equation (6) again, after excluding the observations corresponding to 
the largest 1% of squared residuals.  The second approach (R2), focuses on removing 
influential observations corresponding to equity capital ( ) equal to or larger than the 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
99th empirical percentile1.  Finally, we estimate equation (6) omitting to control for moral 
hazard (R3), thus excluding  from the model.  Table C.2 presents the results from the 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
additional panel data SGMM regression.  The key TIP proxies, , retain their sign, 𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃(𝑆𝐵) < 0
magnitude and significance under all additional regressions (R1, R2 R3).  Only   𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 > 0
becomes significant under R2, however, maintaining its positive sign.  When we remove the 
top 1% of the unconditional equity distribution, we now find tentative evidence in favour of 
the moral hazard hypothesis as equity now becomes significant at 10%.  Similarly, the 
estimated coefficient of the crisis dummy becomes significant at 10%, keeping its magnitude 
and sign.  Finally, results hold for the remaining control variables.
INSERT TABLE C.2
Appendix D: Description of Table 4
In this section we provide a detailed description of Table 4.  More specifically, Section D.1 
presents details for the Fixed Effects (FE) regression, Section D.2 discusses the Robust 
Hausman test, Section D.3 presents details on the SGMM diagnostics and Section D.4 presents 
further modelling choices.
1 We undertake this robustness test on equity as our sample includes a potential outlier who had an equity ratio 
equal to 0.018, 0.041 and 0.046, for 2003, 2004, 2005 respectively which then increases to over 0.8 in 2006, 2007 
and 2008 due to a large capital injection. As mentioned above we find little to no effect in the robustness table 
and so acting conservative let the bank remain in the sample.
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D.1 Fixed Effects Estimation
For comparability with the Pooled OLS and the SGMM regressions, we use the Fixed Effect 
Filter (FEF) estimator proposed by Pesaran & Zhou (2016) to obtain the coefficients of the 
time invariant EU15 and listed dummies that are omitted from the Fixed Effects (FE) model.  
The estimator is computed in two steps: In the first step, FE estimates are computed for the 
coefficients of the time-varying variables, and these estimates are used to filter out the time-
varying effects. The residuals from the first stage panel regression are then averaged over time 
and used as a dependent variable in a cross-section ordinary least squares (OLS) regression that 
includes an intercept and the vector of the time-invariant regressors EU15 and listed dummies.
D.2 Robust Hausman Test
A test of fixed vs. random effects can also be seen as a test of overidentifying restrictions 
where the random effects estimator can be seen as using the additional restrictions that the 
regressors are uncorrelated with the group specific error term.  To test these restrictions we 
follow Arellano (1993) and Wooldridge (2001) and we use the artificial regression where an 
augmented random effects equation is re-estimated and additional variables consisting of the 
original regressors transformed into deviations-from-mean form are included.  The advantage 
of this test of the traditional Hausman test is that it can be robust to heteroskedasticity.  We 
reject the null hypothesis of random-effects in favour of the alternative hypothesis of fixed-
effect at the 1% level.
D.3 SGMM Diagnostics
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation.  The ‘lags’ show the 
number of lags used in the GMM model for bank specific variables.  Our results hold under 
different lag choices.  The Hansen test of over-identification is under the null that all 
instruments are valid.  Under-identification test is the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat (p-value 
reported) of whether the equation is identified, i.e., that the excluded instruments are “relevant”, 
meaning correlated with the endogenous regressors.  The null hypothesis is that the equation is 
under-identified and a rejection of the null indicates that the matrix is full column rank, i.e., the 
model is identified.  This test is estimated following equations (C.1) and (C.2), Appendix C.
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D.4 Further Modelling Choices
Time dummies in preliminary analysis, where found to be jointly insignificant in all 
specifications and consequently they were not included in the analysis.  Furthermore, in 
unreported results, we included country specific dummies in the SGMM.  The results hold and 
remain consistent to the ones presented here.
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Table B.1 Frequency distributions of countries
Country Frequency Percent (%) Cumulative.
Austria 195 6.2 6.2
Belgium 76 2.42 8.62
Bulgaria 44 1.4 10.02
Cyprus 14 0.45 10.46
Czech Republic 54 1.72 12.18
Germany 576 18.31 30.49
Denmark 283 9 39.49
Estonia 22 0.7 40.19
Spain 51 1.62 41.81
Finland 17 0.54 42.35
France 491 15.61 57.97
UK 168 5.34 63.31
Greece 22 0.7 64.01
Hungary 32 1.02 65.02
Italy 294 9.35 74.37
Lithuania 80 2.54 76.92
Luxembourg 137 4.36 81.27
Latvia 125 3.97 85.25
Malta 18 0.57 85.82
Netherlands 24 0.76 86.58
Poland 84 2.67 89.25
Portugal 32 1.02 90.27
Romania 43 1.37 91.64
Sweden 101 3.21 94.85
Slovenia 100 3.18 98.03
Slovakia 62 1.97 100
Total 3,145 100
Number of banks 450
Number of countries 26
This table reports the frequency distribution of the sample used in the SGMM.  In bold we 
highlight the EU15 countries.
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Table B.2.  Number of banks in the sample (per year/country) [SGMM sample]
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Panel
Austria 18 19 16 17 16 15 15 16 19 17 16 11 195
Belgium 7 8 7 6 5 5 6 6 5 7 7 7 76
Bulgaria 1 1 1 1 2 5 4 5 5 6 6 7 44
Cyprus 1 2 3 2 3 3 14
Czech Republic 1 1 2 4 5 5 5 6 7 6 6 6 54
Germany 47 46 48 49 49 49 47 46 54 51 46 44 576
Denmark 21 23 25 26 27 25 25 27 25 23 20 16 283
Estonia 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 1 2 1 22
Spain 1 7 8 8 7 5 6 4 5 51
Finland 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 17
France 35 35 35 36 39 43 43 41 43 46 49 46 491
UK 11 11 12 13 14 12 17 17 15 16 16 14 168
Greece 1 2 3 4 3 3 3 2 1 22
Hungary 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 3 3 32
Italy 3 34 35 35 34 39 40 40 34 294
Lithuania 6 7 6 6 7 8 7 7 6 7 7 6 80
Luxembourg 15 17 14 14 13 14 16 10 8 10 6 137
Latvia 9 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 11 13 12 8 125
Malta 3 3 3 3 3 3 18
Netherlands 2 2 1 1 1 3 3 3 4 4 24
Poland 1 2 2 5 6 7 9 10 11 10 11 10 84
Portugal 1 1 2 3 4 4 5 4 3 3 2 32
Romania 1 2 2 4 5 5 6 6 6 6 43
Sweden 10 10 10 8 7 10 8 4 4 11 11 8 101
Slovenia 5 5 5 6 10 10 11 9 9 11 11 8 100
Slovakia 3 3 3 3 7 7 7 6 5 6 6 6 62
Total 196 204 206 222 274 288 298 294 299 313 296 255 3,145
This table reports the number of banks in the SGMM sample (per year/country).  In bold we highlight the EU15 countries.
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Table B.3. Bank size classes: descriptive statistics
Observations Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
Quintile 1 – Smallest 629 165.95 58.90 42.29 157.55 280.43
Quintile 2 – Small 629 464.51 113.03 280.48 460.09 669.78
Quintile 3 – Medium 629 953.87 180.25 670.46 941.71 1291.64
Quintile 4 – Large 629 2,021.18 517.79 1,294.76 1,958.56 3,134.55
Quintile 5 – Largest 629 8,916.67 6,690.14 3,137.99 6,751.90 4,6820.78
Overall 3,145 2,504.44 4,436.63 42.29 941.71 4,6820.78
Descriptive statistics on size for each size class (expressed in terms of total assets).  Size values 
are expressed in millions of euro (€).
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Figure C.1. Distributions of Technological Innovative Progress (TIP)
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Figure C.2. Distributions of Technological Innovative Progress  Scale
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 Table C.1. SGMM Diagnostics – Main Equation
Joint Estimation Panel A Panel B
variables in differences variables in levels
(Underid)  -  Sanderson-
Windmeijer
(Underid)  -  Sanderson-
Windmeijer






𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 < 0 0.0000 0.0000
𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵 < 0 0.0000 0.0000
𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 > 0 0.0000 0.0000
𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵 > 0 0.0000 0.0000
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 0.0000 0.0000
Under-identification test (Anderson LM 
statistic)
 (p-value = 0.0078)𝜒 2305  (p-value = 0.0220)𝜒 2107
The Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) first-stage chi-squared is a test of under-identification of individual endogenous 
regressors.  It is constructed by "partialling-out" linear projections of the remaining endogenous regressors, under 
the null that the particular endogenous regressor in question is unidentified.  Under-identification test (Anderson 
statistic) is an LM test of whether the equation is identified, i.e., that the excluded instruments are "relevant", 
meaning correlated with the endogenous regressors.  A rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the model is 
identified.
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Table C.2. Robustness Checks – Outlier Identification
R1 R2 R3
𝐿𝐿𝑃 (𝑡 ‒ 1) 0.2834*** 0.2995*** 0.2769***
(0.0808) (0.0791) (0.0829)




𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑟 0.0008 -0.0051 -0.0003
(0.0062) (0.0037) (0.0056)
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅 -0.0497*** -0.0452*** -0.0495***
(0.0143) (0.0118) (0.0134)
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃 0.0503 0.0489 0.0542
(0.0532) (0.0451) (0.0529)
𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑒 -0.0362*** -0.0369*** -0.0336***
(0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0070)
𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 < 0 -0.0854** -0.1022*** -0.0851**
(0.0359) (0.0350) (0.0346)
𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵 < 0 0.3534** 0.3421** 0.2739*
(0.1433) (0.1379) (0.1522)
𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃 > 0 0.0469 0.0653** 0.0150
(0.0326) (0.0301) (0.0411)
𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐵 > 0 -0.0832 -0.0596 -0.0671
(0.1226) (0.1206) (0.1176)
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 -0.0020*** -0.0027*** -0.0012*
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0007)
𝐼𝑁𝑃𝐿 0.0036 -0.0028 0.0076
(0.0193) (0.0172) (0.0215)
𝑙𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑝 -0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 0.0010 0.0016* 0.0013
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009)
𝐸𝑈15 -0.0023* -0.0020* -0.0028**
(0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0014)
𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 0.0001 -0.0004 0.0002
(0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0010)
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 0.0179*** 0.0226*** 0.0094*
(0.0067) (0.0086) (0.0054)
N 3101 3113 3145
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.984 0.817 0.944
Lags 2-4 2-4 2-4
IV count (groups) 442(448) 442(445) 401(450)
Hansen (p-value) 0.600 0.573 0.341
Year Effects Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  Windmeijer (2005) robust standard errors reported.   and  are 𝐴𝑅(1) 𝐴𝑅(2)
tests for first and second order serial correlation, under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation.  The ‘lags’ 
show the number of lags used in the GMM model for bank specific variables.  Our results hold under different 
lag choices.  The Hansen test of over-identification is under the null that all instruments are valid.
